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This paper studies an application of income-related patient cost-sharing.  Using 
data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, we find that varying patient cost-
sharing rates with patient income in the Medicare prescription drug program can reduce 
the severity of two problems: high percent-of-income burdens, and unequal medication 
due to income.  We estimate behavioral responses in the Medicare population and 
incorporate the estimates into a micro-simulation model which uses data that are 
representative of the actual Medicare population.  We find that introducing income-
related patient cost-sharing into a Medicare drug program can dramatically reduce the 
severity of the two problems.   2 
Introduction 
 
Economists have emphasized that patient cost-sharing would reduce the 
premiums or taxes required to finance medical care and give doctors and patients an 
incentive to avoid unnecessary costs (for example, Newhouse, 1993; Feldstein and 
Gruber, 1995).  In the past, however, patient cost-sharing has seldom been varied 
according to the patient’s ability to pay.  Such uniform patient cost-sharing has met 
substantial political resistance on the grounds that it might overburden moderate income 
people and over deter them from using medical care (Gibson et al 2005; Landsman et al 
2005).  This paper attempts to overcome this objection by investigating income-related 
patient cost-sharing: the varying of patient cost-sharing rates with patient income.  
Income-related cost-sharing could be implemented by either private insurance companies 
or government.
1   
We examine how varying a patient’s cost-sharing rate with income can alter two 
patterns that result from uniform cost-sharing that would be viewed as problems by many 
citizens: high percent-of-income burdens, and variation of medical care due to patient 
income.  Although we will refer to these two patterns as problems throughout this paper, 
                                                 
1 To implement it through private insurance companies, government might require each 
enrollee to provide the adjusted gross income from the preceding year’s tax return to the 
insurer, and require the insurer to use a specified cost-sharing schedule.  If the insurer is 
the government, there is a precedent for using income tax returns because the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003 has authorized the use of income tax returns to income-relate 
the premiums under Medicare Part B starting in 2007 as described by Gould 2003.   3 
we recognize that not everyone shares this view.
2  As an empirical illustration of income-
related cost-sharing, we take the specific example of prescription drugs under Medicare.   
To isolate the effects of varying patient cost-sharing rates with patient income, we 
simplify by assuming a patient with a given income, regardless of medical condition, 
pays the same percentage for any medication.
3  Each patient would use a credit card 
issued by the insurer (private or government) to purchase drugs.  The patient would be 
billed by the insurer at the end of month.  The patient would be billed a percentage that 
depends on the patient's income.
4     
To illustrate, a household with an annual income of $20,000 might be billed 20 
percent of its drug bill until its annual bill reaches $2,000 and the household's out-of-
pocket financial burden reaches $400 which is 2 percent of its income; that household 
would not be charged for any additional drug bills incurred that year so its maximum 
burden would be 2 percent of its income.  But a household with an annual income of 
$40,000 might be billed 40 percent of its drug bill until its annual bill reaches $4,000 and 
its out-of-pocket burden reaches $1,600 which is 4 percent of its income; that household 
would not be charged for any additional drug bills so its maximum burden would be 4 
percent of its income.   
                                                 
2 Variation in the consumption of a good or service with income is generally not a 
problem, but many citizens view it as a problem in the case of medical care.           
3 It would be possible to consider varying patient cost-sharing rates not only by patient 
income, but also by other factors such as prevention, chronic illness, demonstrated 
effectiveness of particular medications, and generic versus brand name.  For example, a 
low-income patient would pay a smaller percentage than a high-income patient, but 
patients of a given income might be charged a smaller percentage (even zero) for 
medications likely to prevent much costlier medical services.  Or a patient with a costly 
chronic illness might be charged a smaller percentage to offset the cumulative financial 
burden and prevent disruption of service.   
4 It would be possible to have patients pay a small co-payment at the pharmacy; if so, the 
final billing to the patient would be appropriately adjusted.      4 
Based on data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), we 
simulate the impact of alternative patient cost-sharing plans with approximately the same  
cost to the insurer.  To our knowledge, this study is the first to use actual Medicare data 
to simulate the impact of introducing income-related patient cost-sharing rates into the 
Medicare prescription drug program.  We examine plans in which each patient’s cost-
sharing rate as well as out-of-pocket ceiling would vary with the patient’s income (using 
the previous year’s income tax return).  The study uses the MCBS data to estimate the 
response of prescription drug expenditure to changes in the cost-sharing rate or income 
and incorporates these estimates in the simulations.  We evaluate how alternative cost-
sharing plans would treat two problems: the problem of a high percent-of-income burdens 
and the problem of unequal medication due to income. 
An important empirical study of patient cost-sharing (Feldstein and Gruber 1995) 
analyzes the impact of giving households a “major-risk health insurance policy” which 
consists of a uniform patient cost-sharing rate (such as 50%) until the patient reaches an 
income-related out-of-pocket ceiling (such as 10% of income).  The study includes all 
medical care, excludes the population over 65, and income-relates the out-of-pocket 
ceiling but not the cost-sharing rate below the ceiling.  Our study applies their framework 
to the population over 65, focuses on prescription drug spending, and considers income-
relating the cost-sharing rate as well as the out-of-pocket ceiling.  Studies have been done 
of the impact of patient cost-sharing on seniors’ demand for medical care and the impact 
of cost-sharing on prescription drugs, but none of these studies focuses on the impact of 
income-relating patient cost-sharing (Rice and Matsuoka 2004; Coulson et al. 1995; 
Coulson and Stuart 1995; Shea, Stuart, and Briesacher 2003-2004; Stuart, Simoni-  5 
Wastilia, and Chauncey 2005; Santerre and Vernon 2005; Gibson et al. 2005, Landsman 
et al. 2005; Goldman et al. 2004; Goldman et al. 2006).  Another study analyzes the 
impact of percent-of-income ceilings for Medicare prescription drugs but does not 
investigate the consequence of varying the patient cost-sharing rate with income (Lewis 
and Seidman 2006).  A recent review of the lessons of patient cost-sharing from the 
RAND experiment and other empirical studies (Gruber 2006) concludes that the “right 
way to design health insurance” should include “co-insurance for the typical patient and 
an income-related out-of-pocket limit.”  In this paper, we go a step further and consider 
both income-related out-of-pocket limits and income-related cost-sharing rates.  
 
The Two Problems      
   
Table 1 illustrates the two problems and how they can be mitigated by analyzing a 
hypothetical four-person economy under different patient cost-sharing plans.  In the four-
person economy each person’s medicine use depends on an index of the person’s medical 
condition (the higher the index value, the greater the use), income (the higher the income, 
the greater the use), and patient cost-sharing (the lower the patient cost-sharing, the 
greater the use).  The four persons are SickRich, SickPoor, HealthyRich, and 
HealthyPoor.  A rich person has four times the income of a poor person ($10,000 versus 
$2,500) and uses twice as much medicine as a poor person with the same medical 
condition and patient cost-sharing rate.  A sick person has a medical condition index that 
is four times a healthy person’s and uses four times as much medicine as a healthy person 
who has the same income and cost-sharing rate.  We assume each person faces the same   6 
retail price for medicine prior to cost-sharing.  There are four columns in the table: a 
person’s expenditure on medication, the person’s out-of-pocket burden under the cost-
sharing plan given her expenditure, the insurer’s cost which equals the rest of the 
person’s expenditure, and the person’s percent-of-income burden which equals the 
person’s out-of-pocket burden as a percent of income.  
In computing the numbers in Table 1, we assume each person’s drug expenditure 
M is given by the formula M=Nc
-eY
? where N is an index of the person’s medical 
condition, c is the cost-sharing rate, Y is income, -e is the cost-sharing rate elasticity and 
? is the income elasticity (we set e= ?=0.5).  A Sick person has a higher N than a Healthy 
person (in our example, a Sick person has N=10, a Healthy person, N=2.5).  Further 
details of how the numerical values are computed are given in an appendix available from 
the authors. 
Block 0 of Table 1 shows each person’s medicine use and financial burden when 
each person faces a cost-sharing rate of 25% and there is no ceiling on the person’s 
burden so each person’s out-of-pocket burden equals 25% of her expenditure.  The 
insurer pays the rest of the bill.   
Block 0 reveals two problems.  First, SickPoor’s percent-of-income burden is 
10%, much higher than anyone else’s.  Second, persons with the same medical condition 
differ substantially in the medicine they use solely due to their income: as shown in the 
expenditure column, a rich person uses twice as much medicine as a poor person with the 
same medical condition.  For example, consider SickRich and SickPoor.  SickRich 
spends $2,000 and SickPoor spends $1,000 so their mean expenditure is $1,500 and the   7 
ratio of their standard deviation to their mean, the coefficient of variation of drug 
expenditure, is 47% (the square root of [($2,000-$1,500)
2 + ($1,000-$1,500)
2]/ 
(2-1)=$707 so $707/$1,500=47%).  The coefficient of variation is a useful measure of the 
dispersion of expenditure among persons with the same medical condition.  It is 
particularly useful in comparing the degree of dispersion in sets of individuals that have 
different means.  For example, HealthyRich and HealthyPoor (which have a mean 
expenditure of $375 compared to $1,500 for SickRich and SickPoor) also have a 
coefficient of variation of 47%.       
We consider the two problems in turn: SickPoor’s high percent-of-income burden 
and unequal medication due to income.  To address these problems, we consider four 
different plans in Blocks 1 through 4 that each have the same total insurer cost as in 
Block 0 ($2812.50).  
 
The Percent-of-Income Burden Problem   
 
To handle the percent-of-income burden problem, a percentage ceiling can be 
imposed on the burden any person can bear.  For example, if the ceiling is set at 6%, then 
once a person’s burden reaches the point where the percent-of-income burden equals 6%, 
thereafter the insurer pays 100% of any additional medical bill, so the person’s cost-
sharing rate drops to 0% on additional medication (which we assume induces a person to 
increase medication by 5%).  If the cost-sharing rate is kept the same for all persons, the 
cost-sharing rate needed to keep total insurer spending the same as in Block 0 ($2,812.50) 
turns out to be 26.7%.  The behavior and burdens that would be generated by this plan are   8 
shown in Block 1.  SickPoor’s burden is reduced to 6% of income (instead of the 10% in 
Block 0).  Each of the three other persons receives somewhat less insurer assistance as 
the insurer’s dollars are reallocated to SickPoor.   
Suppose a 6% burden percentage is considered too high for a low-income person.  
Then instead of a 6% ceiling for everyone—a “proportional ceiling”-- consider a ceiling 
of 8% for the high-income persons (SickRich and HealthyRich) and 4% for the low-
income persons (SickPoor and HealthyPoor) -- a “progressive ceiling.”  If the cost-
sharing rate is made the same for all persons, the cost-sharing rate needed to keep total 
insurer spending at target ($2,812.50) turns out to be 27.4%.  The behavior and burdens 
that would be generated by this plan are shown in Block 2.  SickPoor’s burden is reduced 
to 4% of income.  Each of the three other persons receives somewhat less insurer 
assistance as insurer dollars are reallocated to SickPoor. 
 
The Problem of Unequal Medication Due to Income  
 
Note that the problem of unequal medication is as severe in Blocks 1 and 2 as it is 
in Block 0; the coefficient of variation of drug expenditure remains near 47%.  Thus, 
imposing percent of income ceilings does not alleviate this problem.   
Because the source of the problem is that medicine use varies with income, this 
problem can be solved by varying the patient cost-sharing rate directly with income.  We 
adjust the level of the cost-sharing rates so that total insurer spending remains 
approximately $2,812.50.  With the 6% ceiling, it turns out that the cost-sharing rate is 
47.4% for a Rich person and 11.8% for a Poor person as shown in Block 3.  In our   9 
numerical example, the income-related cost-sharing exactly offsets the difference in 
income so that SickRich and SickPoor have the same expenditure ($1,525.57) as do 
HealthyRich and HealthyPoor ($363.23).  In Block 3, the coefficient of variation of drug 
expenditure is 0% for Sick persons and 0% for Healthy persons.   
Similarly, with the progressive ceiling (8% for rich persons and 4% for poor 
persons), it turns out that the cost-sharing rate is 45.2% for a Rich person and 11.3% for a 
Poor person as shown in Block 4.  In our numerical example, SickRich and SickPoor 
have similar expenditure ($1,488 and $1,562), and HealthyRich and HealthyPoor have 
the same expenditure ($372.01).  In Block 4, the coefficient of variation of drug 
expenditure is close to 0% (in fact 3%) for sick persons and 0% for healthy persons.   
  
The Micro-Simulation Model Using Medicare Data 
    
  We now move from the hypothetical four-person model to a model based on 
actual Medicare data.  We construct a micro-simulation model to study the behavior of 
individual Medicare recipients in response to alternative cost-sharing and ceiling regimes 
using the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) Cost and Use files for calendar 
year 2002 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2005).  The 2002 MCBS sample 
consists of 12,697 Medicare enrollees.   
  An important feature of our simulation model is the incorporation of empirically 
estimated responses of medicine use to variations in a person’s cost-sharing rate and 
income.  Prior to the simulations, we use the 2002 MCBS data to estimate the 
responsiveness (elasticities) of medicine use with respect to the cost-sharing rate (-e) and   10 
to income (?).  In the estimation, we control for individual characteristics and for 
utilization of other medical services.   
  The estimates are presented in Table 2.  The left block of three columns presents 
ordinary least squares estimates.  The right block of three columns presents maximum 
likelihood censored normal (Tobit) estimates as is appropriate when the data set includes 
individuals (roughly 15% of the sample) whose expenditure is zero.  The basic 
specification is in logarithms, lnM=b0+b1lnc+b2lnY, where M is an individual’s total 
expenditure (the MCBS includes an adjustment in reported total and out-of-pocket 
spending to correct for any gaps that occur in the interviewing process during the year), c 
is the ratio of out-of-pocket expenditure to total expenditure, and Y is income from all 
sources for individual and spouse.  With the log specification, b1 is the cost-sharing rate 
elasticity (the percentage change in M in response to a 1% change in c), and b2 is the 
income elasticity (the percentage change in M in response to a 1% change in Y).  The 
basic specification is reported in the left column of each block.    
  In order to mitigate the potential effects of omitted variable bias, in the middle 
column of each block we add these variables: female (1 versus 0), the logarithm of age, 
and whether the person died during the year (1 versus 0).  In the right column of each 
block we add the following utilization dummy variables: hospice (equal to 1 for one or 
more hospice bills in the calendar year), inpatient (equal to 1 for one or more inpatient 
discharges), skilled nursing (equal to 1 for one or more skilled nursing facility 
admissions), home health (equal to 1 for one or more home health visits), outpatient 
(equal to 1 for one or more outpatient visits).     11 
  Within each block of coefficient estimates in Table 2, the estimated responses 
remain remarkably stable over both specifications of the statistical model and the 
coefficient estimates are by and large highly significant.  In comparing the elasticities 
between the two blocks, the estimated Tobit cost-sharing rate and income elasticities are 
somewhat larger.  In the simulations below we use the Tobit cost-sharing rate and income 
elasticities in the right column of the Tobit block; the cost-sharing rate elasticity (-e) is  
 -0.791 and the income elasticity (?) is 0.589.  It turns out that the simulation results are 
comparable for both the least squares and Tobit elasticities in the table.      
Our cost-sharing rate elasticity estimate is roughly consistent with a recent study 
(Goldman et al. 2006).  Although that study finds a lower cost-sharing rate (“plan 
generosity”) elasticity for specialty drugs (from 0.01 for cancer drugs to 0.21 for 
rheumatoid arthritis), the authors comment: “What is most striking about these results is 
how inelastic demand is—that is how insensitive patients are to price—in comparison to 
traditional pharmaceuticals, for which it is not uncommon to see responses from 30-50 
percent when copayments double” implying an elasticity of 0.30 to 0.50 (Goldman et al. 
2006).  The authors add: “More evidence has convincingly shown that demand for 
prescription drugs is elastic as well.  Our own work suggests that doubling copayments in 
the most common plans will reduce spending by about 33 percent.”  That study’s 
estimate comes from a sample of fifty five health plans offered by fifteen large employers 
whereas ours comes from the Medicare sample (MCBS) itself.  Two other recent studies 
(Goldman et al. 2004 and Landsman et al. 2005) of the effect of coinsurance on 
prescription drug expenditures have similar results.      12 
  In conducting the simulations, we use MCBS cross-section weights to expand the 
sample to 41,742 enrollees which are representative of the entire Medicare population of 
approximately 42 million, but 1/1000
th its size (we use a large FORTRAN program to 
construct the expanded data set and conduct the simulations).  We use the entire sample, 
based on the assumption that the subsidy from taxpayers is sufficient to induce even 
affluent seniors to join the Medicare prescription drug plan, just as it does for part B of 
Medicare for physician coverage. 
In the hypothetical four-person economy, we assumed that each person’s use of 
medication depended on just three factors: an assigned index of the person’s medical 
condition, the person’s income, and the person’s cost-sharing rate.  But in the actual data, 
each person’s use of medication varies with the person’s medical condition, income, cost-
sharing rate, attitude towards the efficacy and risk of medication, and other factors.   
From actual data on each person’s expenditure, income, and cost-sharing (but not on 
attitude or on other factors), we infer an index of the person’s medical condition.  Given 
this index, we simulate how each person’s expenditure would change in response to a 
change in cost-sharing.   
To infer the index of a person’s medical condition, we use data for each person’s 
total drug expenditure and out-of-pocket burden and assume (as in Goldman et al. 2006) 
that each person’s drug use varies with the ratio of out-of-pocket to total expenditure (the 
average cost-sharing ratio for the person, which Goldman et. al. call “plan generosity”).  
Our estimate of each person’s medical condition assumes the data have been generated 
without an out-of-pocket ceiling.  Because we do not have data on each person’s attitude 
towards the efficacy and risk of medication, or on other factors that affect medication use,   13 
we can only estimate a likely (“expected” in the statistical sense) medical condition for 
each person. 
  We now repeat the experiments we conducted for the four-person model for our 
expanded data set of 41,742 persons.  In the simulations, we compare alternative cost-
sharing regimes by adjusting parameters so that total insurer spending equals 
approximately $50 million (based on a projection that the Medicare drug plan costs 
roughly $50 billion per year, and the fact that our sample is 1/1000 of the total Medicare 
population in 2002).   
As in the four-person model, there are two problems under uniform cost-sharing 
with no ceiling.  First, some individuals experience a high out-of-pocket burden relative 
to income.  Second, for persons with a similar medical condition, there is significant 
variation in the use of medication.   
Block 0 of Table 3 shows the two problems.  Block 0 shows what would happen 
under uniform cost-sharing with no ceiling.  We adjust the uniform cost-sharing rate such 
that the total insurer expenditure for our sample of 41,742 enrollees is $50 million.  The 
cost-sharing rate turns out to be 26.9%.   
The first problem—the high percentage burden for some individuals—is shown in 
the three percent-of-income burden columns: 5.8% of the population (approximately 2.4 
million people based on the 2002 total Medicare population of 41.7 million) has a burden 
percentage over 10%; 8.9% (3.7 million people), over 7.5%; and 15.1% (6.3 million 
people), over 5%.  Not shown in the table, 1.5% (0.6 million) has a burden percentage 
over 25%; 0.7% (0.3 million), over 50%, and 0.4% (0.2 million), over 100%.    14 
The second problem— unequal medication due to income-- is shown in the right 
column.  To see the magnitude of this problem, we examine a sub-sample of individuals 
with a similar medical condition index.  Recall that the index is higher for persons who 
are sicker.  For illustration, we take a sub-sample of 91 individuals who have 
approximately the same high index value—specifically, approximately (within 5%) three 
times the mean index value for the entire sample-- and then compute the coefficient of 
variation of drug expenditures for these 91 individuals.  In Block 0 the coefficient of 
variation is 45% (the ratio of the standard deviation $4,020 to the mean $8,948). 
 
The Percent-of-Income Burden Problem   
 
Consider first the percent-of-income burden problem.  To handle this problem, 
suppose a percent-of-income ceiling is set on the burden a person can bear.  We consider 
two alternative ceiling schedules.  Under a “proportional” ceiling, the percentage ceiling 
is the same for all persons.  Under a “progressive” ceiling, the percentage ceiling varies 
directly with a person’s income; specifically, as income rises, the percent-of-income 
ceiling rises gradually according to a formula until it reaches a limit.  The formula that 
relates the percent-of-income ceiling to the person’s income is given in an appendix 
available from the authors and the results are presented in a table; for example, for an 
income of $11,750, the ceiling is 3.3%; of $22,500, 5.1%; of $160,000, 7.5%.  If a person 
reaches the out-of-pocket ceiling, additional medication is “free,” so we assume that the 
person increases medicine use by approximately 8% (we assume the percent increase in 
medicine equals ten times the cost-sharing rate elasticity).
   15 
Blocks 1 and 2 of Table 3, which assume that the cost-sharing rate is uniform, 
show how the two alternative ceiling schedules solve the burden problem.  In Block 1 of 
Table 3, the ceiling is proportional, set at 5% of income; with the cost-sharing rate 
uniform, the rate needed to keep total insurer spending $50 million for our sample of 
41,742 enrollees turns out to be 30.0%.  In Block 2 of the table, the ceiling is progressive 
where the percent-of-income ceiling rises with income until it reaches a limit of 7.5%; 
with the cost-sharing rate uniform, the rate needed to keep total insurer spending $50 
million turns out to be 30.6%.   
In Block 1 no enrollee has a burden percentage greater than 5%, and in Block 2, 
only a small percent (2.2%) have a burden percentage greater than 5% (but less than 
7.5% under the progressive ceiling).  
 
The Problem of Unequal Medication Due to Income   
 
But whichever ceiling (proportional or progressive) is chosen, as seen in the right 
column of Blocks 1 and 2, the coefficient of variation remains 45%.  So introducing a 
ceiling solves the burden problem but not the unequal medication problem.     
The unequal medication problem can be mitigated by income-relating the cost-
sharing, varying the rate directly with the person’s income.  Specifically, as income rises, 
the cost-sharing rate rises gradually according to a formula until it reaches a limit.  The 
formula that relates the cost-sharing rate to the person’s income is given in an appendix 
available from the authors and the results are presented in a table; for example, for an   16 
income of $11,750, the rate is 25.0%; of $22,500, 38.0%; of $160,000, 56.3% (we 
impose a floor on the rate of 1% for incomes less than about $400). 
Blocks 3 and 4 of Table 3 show how income-related cost-sharing mitigates the 
problem of unequal medication among patients with the same medical condition and the 
same preference concerning the use of medication.  In Block 3 of Table 3, the ceiling is 
proportional, set at 5% of income, and the cost-sharing rate rises with income according 
to a formula with the rate limit adjusted so that total insurer spending is $50 million for 
our sample of 41,742.  It turns that the required rate limit is 60.8%.  In Block 4, the 
ceiling is progressive with a limit of 7.5%, and the cost-sharing rate rises with income.  
The rate limit required to keep total insurer spending $50 million turns out to be 62.1%.     
The mitigation of the problem of unequal medication due to income is shown in 
the right column of Blocks 3 and 4 of Table 3.  Recall that in this table we examine a sub-
sample of 91 individuals who have approximately the same high medical condition index 
value and then compute the coefficient of variation for these 91 individuals; and that in 
Blocks 0, 1, and 2, the coefficient of variation is 45%.  By contrast, in Blocks 3 and 4 the 
coefficient of variation is only 6%.  
To summarize the results in Table 3:  A percent-of-income ceiling takes care of 
the burden-percentage problem, but varying a patient’s cost-sharing rate with patient 
income is needed to mitigate the problem of unequal medication due to income.  Thus, to 
mitigate both problems there must be a percent-of-income burden ceiling (proportional or 
progressive) and income-related cost-sharing (so that the cost-sharing rate varies directly 
with income).     17 
In Table 4 we examine additional sub-samples of individuals.  Within each sub-
sample, individuals have roughly the same (within 5%) medical condition index value; 
however, the index value differs substantially between sub-samples.  Recall from Table 3 
that we calculated the coefficient of variation of drug expenditures for 91 individuals 
whose medical condition index was approximately (within 5%) three times the mean 
index value of the entire sample.  In Table 4, each sub-sample has an index value roughly 
(within 5%) equal to a particular multiple of the mean index value of the entire sample.  
A higher multiple indicates a sicker sub-sample.  In the fourth row of the table the 
multiple is 3.0; we have already presented this case in the right column of Table 3.   
In each row of Table 4, the number in the right column, the coefficient of 
variation of drug expenditures under income-related cost-sharing, is substantially smaller 
than the number in the middle column, the coefficient of variation under uniform cost-
sharing.  This holds true for a wide range of sub-samples, each with very different 
medical condition index values (multiples of the mean index value ranging from 0.5 and 
5.0).  Thus, the results shown above in the right column of Table 3 generalize for 
additional sub-samples with a wide range of medical conditions.   
   
A Proportional versus a Progressive Ceiling 
 
Given the necessity of using income-related cost-sharing to mitigate the problem 
of unequal medication, we now compare a proportional ceiling to a progressive ceiling.  
In Table 3, Block 3, generated by the proportional ceiling of 5%, prevents anyone from 
exceeding a 5% burden, whereas Block 4, generated by a progressive ceiling (with a   18 
maximum of 7.5%), does permit 2.3% of the sample to exceed a 5% burden, but at the 
same time, achieves a less than 5% ceiling for lower-income persons.  We now examine 
this trade-off. 
Changing from the proportional ceiling (block 3) to the progressive ceiling (block 
4) decreases the percent-of-income burden for 19% of the sample while increasing the 
percent-of-income burden for 66% of the sample (the remaining 15% of the sample used 
no medication so its percent-of-income burden is zero under either ceiling).  However the 
19% who are helped with a decrease in the percent-of-income burden have a much lower 
mean income than the 66% who experience an increase ($10,312 vs $35,546); and the 
19% who are helped have a much higher (sicker) medical condition index than the 66% 
who are hurt (14 vs 1).  For the 19% who are helped, their percent-of-income burden on 
average decreases by 1.74%, while for the 66% who are hurt, their percent-of-income 
burden on average increases by only 0.03%.  Note that the proportional ceiling is binding 
for 6,530 enrollees (16% of the 41,742) while the progressive ceiling is binding for 8,696 




In this paper we investigated the impact of varying a patient’s cost-sharing rate 
according to patient income.  We used the Medicare prescription drug program for 
illustration.  We illuminated the properties of our model with a four-person example. 
Using data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, we estimated a censored 
(Tobit) regression model to incorporate the behavioral responses in the Medicare   19 
population into the micro-simulation model and then performed simulations.  We found 
that introducing income-related patient cost-sharing into a Medicare prescription drug 
program can substantially reduce the severity of two problems: high percent-of-income 
burdens, and unequal medication due to income. 
Of course, patient behavior for medical care is more complex than we have 
captured in our simplified model and it would certainly not be possible in practice to fine-
tune equity among all patients.  Nevertheless, our study does suggest that substantial 
improvement in the equity of medical care might be obtainable by introducing a percent-
of-income ceiling and varying a patient’s cost-sharing rate with the patient’s income.  
   20 
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Table 1.  Four-Person Model  
 Uniform and Income-Related Cost-Sharing and Burden Ceilings 
Total Insurer Spending = $2,812.5  
 

















Block 0 – Uniform Cost Sharing (cost-sharing rate 25%) and No Ceiling 
SickRich   $2,000  $500.00  $1,500.00    5.00% 
SickPoor   $1,000  $250.00     $750.00  10.00%  47% 
HealthyRich      $500  $125.00     $375.00    1.25% 
HealthyPoor      $250    $62.50     $187.50    2.50%  47% 
 
Block 1 - Uniform Cost Sharing (cost-sharing rate =26.7%) and a 6% Ceiling  
SickRich  $1,933.51  $517.19  $1,416.32    5.17% 
SickPoor  $1,015.09  $150.00     $865.09      6.00%  44% 
HealthyRich     $483.38  $129.30     $354.08       1.29% 
HealthyPoor     $241.69    $64.65     $174.04    2.59%  47%   
 
Block 2 - Uniform Cost Sharing (cost-sharing rate =27.4%) and an 8%,4% Ceiling  
SickRich  $1,911.50  $523.15  $1,388.35    5.23% 
SickPoor  $1,003.54  $100.00     $903.54      4.00%  44% 
HealthyRich     $477.87  $130.79     $347.09       1.31% 
HealthyPoor     $238.94    $65.39     $173.54    2.62%  47%   
 
Block 3 - Income-Related Cost Sharing (cost-sharing rate for Rich= 47.4%, cost-sharing 
rate for Poor=11.8%) and a 6% Ceiling 
SickRich  $1,525.57  $600.00      $925.57    6.00% 
SickPoor  $1,525.57  $150.00   $1,375.57      6.00% 
0% 
HealthyRich     $363.23  $172.07      $191.17      1.72% 
HealthyPoor     $363.23    $43.02     $320.22    1.72% 
0% 
 
Block 4 - Income-Related Cost Sharing (cost-sharing rate for Rich = 45.2%, cost-sharing 
rate for Poor =11.3%) and an 8%,4% Ceiling  
SickRich  $1,488.05  $672.02      $816.03    6.72% 
SickPoor  $1,562.46  $100.00   $1,462.46      4.00%  3% 
HealthyRich     $372.01  $168.00      $204.01      1.68% 
HealthyPoor     $372.01    $42.00     $330.01    1.68%  0% 
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Table 2:  Elasticity Estimates 
Dependent Variable lnM, Sample = 12697 
“t” values below estimates 
 
 




































































Hospice       -0.554 
(1.94) 
    -0.638 
(1.84) 
Inpatient       0.825 
(8.06) 
    0.925 
(7.71) 
Skilled Nursing       -2.562 
(13.98) 
    -3.067 
(13.99) 
Home Health       1.093 
(7.27) 
    1.289 
(7.31) 
Outpatient       0.702 
(9.52) 
    0.778 
(8.98) 
             
Adj R
2  0.115  0.151  0.176  0.111  0.145  0.170 
 
* 10792 uncensored observations; 1905 left {ln(0.01)} censored observations.    25 
 
Table 3: MCBS Sample of 41,742 Enrollees 
























Block 0 - Uniform Cost Sharing with No Ceiling 
 
26.9%  none  5.8%  8.9%  15.1%  45% 
 
Block 1 - Uniform Cost Sharing with Proportional Ceiling 
  
30.0%  5%  0%  0%  0%  45% 
 
Block 2 - Uniform Cost Sharing with Progressive Ceiling 
 
30.6%  Min 0.0% 
Max 7.5% 
0%  0%  2.2%  45% 
 




5%  0%  0%  0%  6% 
 






0%  0%  2.5%  6% 
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Table 4: Sub-Samples of Enrollees with Similar Medical Condition 
 
      Uniform Cost Sharing  
Blocks 0, 1 and 2 
Income-Related Cost Sharing 








Coefficient of Variation of Drug 
Expenditure 
 
Coefficient of Variation of Drug 
Expenditure 
0.5  1,277        41%    15% 
1.0  813        44%    15% 
2.0  263               42%    7% 
3.0  91        45%    6% 
4.0  43        46%    12% 
5.0  56        61%    15% 
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APPENDIX AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST FROM THE AUTHORS 
 
INCOME-RELATED PATIENT COST-SHARING: 
SIMULATION FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS UNDER MEDICARE 
 
In the four-person model, the medicine expenditure M of each person is given by 
the
 demand equation M = Nc
-eY
 ? where N is an index of medical condition (10 for each  
Sick person, 2.5 for each Healthy person), c is the cost-sharing rate, Y is income ($10,000 
for each Rich person, $2,500 for each Poor person), -e is the cost-sharing rate elasticity 
(e=0.5) and ? is the income elasticity (?=0.5).  Note that the equation gives the M chosen 
when the person is not protected by an out-of-pocket ceiling imposed by the government; 
if a person hits the out-of-pocket ceiling so that additional medicine is “free” we assume 
the person increases expenditure by 10e% (5% because e=0.5) above the M given by the 
equation. 
In order to solve the problem of unequal medication due to income, the cost-
sharing rate is varied directly with income—that is, the strategy is to reduce c in the 
demand equation when Y decreases in order to keep M constant.  As long as the cost-
sharing rate elasticity (-e) is not zero, it counters the effect of the income elasticity ?.  
From the demand equation, to keep M the same for persons with the same M (with no 
burden ceiling), c=(N/M)
1/e(Y)
?/e.  Here, e=? and YRich=4YPoor so cRich=4cPoor. 
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  The variables used in Table 2 are from the following MCBS sources.  Total 
expenditure is variable AAMTTOT and out-of-pocket expenditure is AAMTOOP, both 
from MCBS, RIC:SS (Service Summary).The income variable is from MCBS, RIC:1 
(Survey Identification), INCOME_C.  The variables female, age and died are based on 
data from MCBS, RIC:A (Administrative Identification), for date of death (H_DOD), 
gender (H_SEX) and age (H_AGE).  The utilization indicator variables are based on data 
from MCBS, RIC:A (Administrative Identification), for hospice bills (H_HOSSW), 
inpatient discharges (H_INPSW), skilled nursing (H_SNFSW), home health 
(H_HHASW), and out-patient visits (H_OUTSW). 
In conducting the simulations, we use MCBS cross-section weights to expand the 
sample.  The cross-section weights are from MCBS, RIC:X (Cross-sectional Weights), 
variable CS1YRWGT.  
As in the four-person model above, we assume the demand for prescription drugs 
is given by M=Nc
-eY
 ?,
 but now e = 0.791 and ? = 0.589 for all persons.  We have MCBS 
data on each person’s income Y, total expenditure for prescribed medicine M and out-of-
pocket burden B for prescribed medicine.  We measure each person’s initial cost-sharing 
rate as c = B/M, and assume the data were generated without any out-of-pocket ceiling 
protection.  Using values for M, c, Y, e and ?, we solve the demand equation presented  
above for N in order to infer its value for each person. Thus, the data set consists of a 
sample of 41,742 Medicare enrollees each of whom has an income and an N that yields 
the person’s actual drug expenditures M; the data sample has the profile of the Medicare 
population for a given year but with imputed values for the unobservable N.    29 
Under a “progressive” ceiling, the percentage ceiling varies directly with a 
person’s income; specifically, a person’s ceiling percentage is given by e=em – [em/(ae)
Y],   
where ae is a parameter slightly greater than 1, and em is a parameter equal to the 
maximum possible ceiling percentage; thus, if Y is 0, e is 0, and as Y gets very large, e 
asymptotically approaches em.  If a person reaches the out-of-pocket ceiling, additional 
medication is “free,” so we assume that the person increases the quantity demanded by 
10e % above what it would have been according to formula.  The Appendix Table shows 
how the percent-of-income ceiling e varies for selected Y.  
Under income-related cost-sharing, the cost-sharing rate equals c = cm – [cm/ac
Y ],  
where ac is a parameter slightly greater than 1, and cm is a parameter equal to the 
maximum possible cost-sharing rate; thus, if Y is 0, c is 0, and as Y gets very large, c 
asymptotically approaches cm.  The Appendix Table shows how the cost-sharing rate c 
(for text Table 3 Block 4’s cm = 62.1%) varies for selected Y.  
The sd/m percentages in the right column of text Table 3 are calculated as 
follows: Block 0, 45%=$4,020/$8,947; Block 1, 45%=$3,691/$8,214; Block 2, 
45%=$3,635/$8,088; Block 3, 6%=$566/$8,969; Block 4, 6%=$552/$8,833.  In the 
fourth and fifth blocks generated by income-related cost-sharing, the standard deviation is 
almost 85% lower than in the first three blocks generated by uniform cost-sharing ($566 
and $552 versus $4,020, $3,691, and $3,635).  In the last two blocks the standard 
deviation is only 6% of the mean, whereas in the first in three blocks the standard 
deviation is 45% of the mean.   30 
 
Appendix Table:  Schedule of Progressive Ceilings and Income-Related Cost Sharing 
Rates for Selected Incomes 
 








Max 7.5%  
Cost-Sharing 
Rates 









  0-2.5  $1250  0.5%  3.76%  2.36%  2.36% 
  2.5-5  $3750  1.3%  10.61%  1.51%  3.87% 
  5-7.5  $6250  2.0%  16.65%  9.84%  13.71% 
  7.5-10  $8750  2.7%  21.98%  11.14%  24.85% 
  10-12.5  $11750  3.3%  27.57%  9.51%  34.36% 
  12.5-15  $14250  3.8%  31.62%  8.39%  42.75% 
  15-20  $17500  4.4%  36.18%  12.45%  55.20% 
  20-25  $22500  5.1%  41.91%  10.90%  66.10% 
  25-30  $27500  5.6%  46.37%  8.97%  75.07% 
  30-35  $32500  6.0%  49.85%  4.76%  79.83% 
  35-40  $37500  6.3%  52.55%  4.73%  84.56% 
  40-45  $42500  6.6%  54.66%  2.73%  87.29% 
  45-50  $47500  6.8%  56.30%  3.65%  90.94% 
  50-75  $62500  7.2%  59.36%  5.61%  96.55% 
  75-100  $87500  7.4%  61.31%  1.98%  98.53% 
  100-140  $120000  7.5%  61.94%  0.70%  99.23% 
  140-180  $160000  7.5%  62.07%  0.28%  99.51% 
  180+  $220000  7.5%  62.09%  0.49%  100.00% 
 
  
 
 